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Abstract
Trade preferences  are a key element in industrial  export structures.  There is a group  of LDCs for whom
countries'  efforts to assist the integration  of least  EU trade preferences on existing exports are  not
developed countries  (LDCs) into the world economy.  significant  since these exports are mainly of products
Brenton provides  an initial evaluation  of the impact of  where the most-favored-nation  duty is zero. Export
the European  Union's recently  introduced  "Everything  diversification  is the key  issue for these countries.  For
but Arms"  (EBA) initiative  on the products currently  other LDCs, EU preferences  have  the potential to
exported by the  LDCs. He shows that the changes  provide a more substantial  impact on trade.  However,
introduced by the EBA initiative  in 2001  are relatively  the author shows that only  50 percent of EU imports
minor for currently exported products, primarily because  from non-ACP (Africa,  Caribbean,  and Pacific)  LDCs
over 99 percent of EU  imports from the LDCs are  in  which are  eligible actually request  preferential  access to
products  which the EU  had already liberalized,  and the  the  EU. The prime suspect for this low level of use  are
complete removal  of barriers to the  key remaining  the rules of origin, both the restrictiveness of the
products-rice,  sugar,  and bananas-has  been delayed.  requirements  on sufficient processing and the costs and
Brenton  looks at the role  EU preferences  to LDCs  in  difficulties of providing the  necessary documentation.
general  have been playing and could play in assisting the  More simple rules of origin are likely to enhance  the
integration  of the  LDCs.  He shows that there is  impact of EU trade  preferences  in terms  of improving
considerable  variation  across countries  in the potential  market access and in stimulating diversification  toward a
impact that EU preferences  can have  given current  broader range of exports.
This paper-a product of the International Trade Department, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network-
is part of a larger effort  in the network to analyze the impact of trade preferences.  Copies of the paper are available  free
from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Lili Tabada, room MC2-4 10, telephone
202-473-6896, fax 202-522-7551, email address ltabada@worldbank.org.  Policy Research Working Papers are also posted
on  the Web  at http://econ.worldbank.org.  The author  may  be contacted  at pbrenton@worldbank.org.  April  2003.  (31
pages)
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countries they represent.
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I am  very  grateful  for  the  comments  of Andrea  Rossi,  Claire  Thirriot,  Robert Kirk,  Larry  Hinkle,  and
participants of a trade seminar at the World Bank.1. Introduction
Trade preferences  are seen by many as  an essential  element in integrating  the developing
countries,  and particularly  the  least  developed  countries,  into  the  world  trading  system.
Trade  preferences  in  OECD  countries  are  expected  to  encourage  the  importation  of
products  from  developing  countries,  raising  the  export  earnings  of  these  countries,
stimulating  investment  and  growth.  Initial  preference  schemes  were  introduced  in  the
1970s  under  the  "Generalised  System  of Tariff Preferences"  (GSP).  Over  the  past  3
decades  the exports  of some of the developing  countries,  particularly  those in  east Asia,
have grown  strongly.  However,  export success has not been uniform  and some  developing
countries,  those  at the  lowest  levels  of income,  have  been  left behind.  In  response  there
have  been  a  number  of recent  initiatives  in  OECD  countries  to  further  discriminate  in
favour of the least developed  countries (LDCs).  Most notable  amongst these are the EU's
Everything  But  Arms  (EBA)  initiative  and  the  African  Growth  and  Opportunity  Act
(AGOA)  of the US.
This paper takes a look at the initial  impact of the EBA, which came into effect in March
2001,  although as we shall  show the vast majority of imports  from the LDCs were already
entering  the EU duty and quota  free.  The impact of the changes introduced  in 2001  on the
products  currently  exported  were  therefore  relatively minor  and  as  such  they  should be
seen  as the final,  but small,  step in a longer term process that the EU has implemented  to
provide complete duty and  quota free access to the LDCs.  The paper goes on to look more
broadly at the impact of EU preferences  and seeks to assess the scope,  actual and potential,
that the EBA, broadly defined as covering all products with duty free access to the EU, can
play in integrating the least developed countries into the world economy.
The focus of the paper is on those products currently exported by the LDCs. For a group of
the poorest  countries  it  is clear that under current trade structures preferences  are  of no
real value since almost  all exports are concentrated  in products  for which  the EU external
tariff  is  zero.  For  these  countries  the  key  issue  is  to  what  extent  the  EU  scheme  of
preferences  can  assist in  stimulating  diversification  into  a  broader range  of exports.  For
other countries the value of EU preferences under the current  structure of exports is more
2significant  due to  a higher export  share of dutiable products  and the  larger magnitude of
available preferences.  However,  it appears  that improvements  in market access  are often
constrained  by  the  nature  of the  rules  which  govern  the  granting  of preferences.  The
adoption  of more  simple  rules of origin  would be of particular  benefit  to many  of these
LDCs.
2. The Everything But Arms Initiative
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the exports of the LDCs to the EU since  1988. The period
from  1989  to  1993  was  one  of absolute  decline  in  the  value  of exports  to  the  EU.
Subsequently there has been moderate but sustained growth in the value of exports, with a
very substantial increase of over  35  per cent in 2000.  Nevertheless,  the  figure  shows that
the relative decline of LDC exports to the EU continued throughout the  1990s with a slight
recovery in 2000 and 2001.  In 2001  the LDC share of the EU import market was about 25
per cent lower than in 1988. It is against this background that we now consider the possible
impact of the changes  introduced  in  2001  by the EBA initiative and  then consider  more
broadly the importance of EU preferences to the LDCs.
The EBA  regulation  grants  duty-free  access  to  imports  of all products  from  the  least
developed  countries,  with  the  exception  of  arms  and  munitions,  and  without  any
quantitative  restrictions.  The  EU  has  argued  that  "this  significantly enhances  export
opportunities  and  hence  potential  income  and  growth  for  these  countries"  (CEC(2002)
emphasis  added).  Liberalisation  was immediate  except  for three  products  fresh bananas,
rice  and sugar where  tariffs  will be gradually reduced  to  zero  (in 2006  for bananas  and
2009 for rice and  sugar). There are duty-free tariff quotas for rice and sugar which will be
increased  annually.  It  is  important  to  note  that  the  majority  of products  from  these
countries  already received  duty free treatment under the GSP or Cotonou Agreement. The
EBA proposal extended tariff and quota free access  to the EU market to the remaining  919
(of these 44 tariff lines were products with full liberalization delayed)  of the  10200 tariff
3lines.  The vast majority of these 919 products are agricultural  products, including  certain
meat products, vegetables, fruits, wines and prepared  foodstuffs, such as biscuits and jams.
An important feature of the EBA is that it is embedded in the EU's GSP scheme and access
to  the  EIJ market  is governed  by the  rules  of that  scheme.  At present  the  African  and
Caribbean  countries  (ACP)  can,  if they  wish,  continue  to  export  to  the  EU under  the
Cotonou  Agreement,  the  rules  of which  governing  preferential  access  are  in  important
aspects  different  to those  of the GSP. This  is an issue that we will return to in more detail
below. It is important to note that the non-ACP countries can only gain zero duty access to
the EU market under the EBA.
A key difference  between  the EBA  and other unilateral  preferences  granted by the EU is
that preferences  for the  least developed  countries  are  granted  for an unlimited period and
are not subject to periodic  review.  This contrasts with the current GSP  scheme which will
cease  at the  end of 2004.  As such  the EBA  should  provide  exporters  and investors  with
greater certainty of market access to the EU and therefore  stimulate greater capacity in the
production  of existing  products  and  an environment  conducive  to the  export  of a wider
range of products.  This is a crucial aspect of the EBA. However,  this may be undermined
to an extent by the inclusion of a new reason  for the temporary  suspension of preferences:
"massive  increases in imports of products originating  in the LDCs in relation to their usual
levels of production  and export  capacity".  This could  act  as  a constraint upon large-scale
investment  that  transforms  production  capacities  in  a  particular  country  and  may  limit
diversification  into new products.2
Of the 919 product lines liberalised under the EBA, imports  from the LDCs3 were recorded
in just  80  of the  tariff  lines  in 2000,  with  13  of these  lines  being  products  where  full
liberalisation  is  delayed,  bananas,  sugar  and  rice.  Imports  of these  80  product  lines
1  For some product  categories  liberalisation  had  already been  implemented  for  the ACP  countries  whilst  for
other categones  zero duty access  was already available for the non-ACP  LDCs.
2  This clause  was initially  discussed m the context of combating  fraud, however,  this is not made clear in the
Legislation and it would appear that it could be mvoked in more general  circumstances.
3 Myanmnar  is currently  excluded  from  preferences  for political  reasons.  Senegal  also became  eligible  for
EBA preferences  from the start of 2002 but is not included here.
4amounted to 73.6 million euro  in 2000, equivalent to around one half of one per cent of
total LDC exports to the EU, but 63 million  euro of these imports were in products with
delayed  liberalization  (Table  1).4 In 2001  the LDCs exported to the EU again in 80 of the
categories  liberalised  by  the  EBA,  with  11  of  these  being  products  with  delayed
liberalization.  Exports  to the EU of products  liberalized  in 2001  amounted to  3.7 million
euro, a substantial decline  from the exports of 10.7 million euro of such products in 2000.
However,  driving these figures was a decline from 7.2 million euro in 2000 to 0.8 million
euro  in 2001  of imports  of grain  sorghum from  Sudan.  Excluding  this  exceptional  item
trade  in  products  liberalised  under  the  EBA  in  2001  fell  from  3.5  million  euro  to  2.9
million euro. The value of exports of products with delayed liberalization  fell slightly from
62.9 to 60.7 million euro.  Table  1 also shows that the vast majority of exports of products
liberalized  under  the EBA  emanate  from  the  ACP countries.  Very small  flows  of these
products currently come from the non-ACP countries.5
Total exports to the EU of the LDCs, on the other hand, increased  by 9.6 per cent in 2001.
Thus,  it  is  difficult  to  postulate  that  liberalisation  under  the  EBA  has  stimulated  this
increase in total trade.  Indeed within  this overall total there is wide variation in the growth
of exports to the  EU amongst the  LDC countries.  For 12  of the LDCs, exports to the EU
fell by more than 30 per cent between 2000 and 2001. For another 16 countries exports  fell
but by less than  30 per cent.  Exports to the EU increased  for  19  LDCs, with 9 of these
experiencing growth of more than 30 per cent. Thus, for the majority of the LDCs exports
to the EU declined in 2001.  This demonstrates that market access is just one of a range of
factors,  which  include  price  volatility  for  primary  products  and  domestic  supply
constraints,  that are influencing  the value of LDC exports to the EU.
The  direct  impact  of the  liberalisation  provided by the EBA  in 2001  is shown  in more
detail in Table  2, which  shows  for each of the LDCs  the value of exports to the EU in
products  for which  there  was  liberalisation  of EU trade barriers  in 2001.  In general  the
amount of trade in products liberalized in 2001 is very small reaching at most one per cent
4 The key product here is sugar, exports of which to the EU amounted to 47.9 million euros in 2000.
5of total exports  to the EU for Haiti and amounting  to three one-hundredths  of one per cent
of total LDC exports to the EU in 2001.  The table also shows the amount of exports to the
EU which were eligible  for these improved preferences  and which requested preferential
access  to the  EU under  the  EBA  initiative.  None of the  eligible  imports  from  the ACP
countries  actually requested  and  therefore  were  not granted  preferential  access under the
EBA.  It would appear that the EBA has had no immediate impact on EU imports from the
ACP countries.  This  is in  contrast  to the  non-ACP countries  where three-quarters  of the
exports of products for which tariffs were removed in 2001  were actually granted duty-free
access under the EBA.  We assume that  for various  reasons to be discussed in more detail
below  imports  from  the  ACP  countries  are  still  entering  the  EU  under  the  Cotonou
Agreement rather than under the EBA.
The  table also  shows  the value  of exports  to the  EU in  2001  of bananas,  rice  and  sugar,
products  which  will  be  fully  liberalised  under  the  EBA  but with  some  delay.  Here  the
potential impact of the EBA is more significant for particular  countries.  For example,  due
to the importance of sugar,  almost  12 per cent of the value of Malawi's  exports to the EU
in 2001 was from products which will be subject to future liberalisation.  Significant shares
of the exports of Bhutan, Sudan and Zambia are also in products where market access may
improve  in the  future.  Overall,  bananas,  rice and sugar comprised  almost  one half of one
per cent of total LDC exports to the EU in 2001. These products are much more important
in the exports of the ACP countries than in the exports of the non-ACP countries.  Thus, of
the  products  which  had  not  been  fully  liberalized  under  the  GSP  or  the  Cotonou
Agreement it is precisely those products which are or more importance to the LDCs where
full liberalisation has been delayed.  However,  it is worth noting that on the basis of current
exports to  the EU most of the  LDC will  be unaffected  by future  liberalisation  under the
EBA. Thirty two of the LDCs did not export any bananas, rice or sugar to the EU in 2001.
Thus we conclude from an analysis of the exports of LDCs of products liberalized in 2001
that the  direct impact of the EBA has not  so  far been  significant:  very small amounts  of
S  However,  UNCTAD  (2001)  suggests  some  export  potential  m  these  products  for  countries  such  as
Bangladesh.
6exports are concerned  and for all the ACP countries exports of products which have been
liberalized have not entered the EU market under the EBA. It may be that adjustment to the
new regime  will  take  some  time  as  different  documentation  is  required  than  under  the
Cotonou Agreement.  It could also be that substantial  investment is required for these new
preferences  to  be  exploited,  for  example,  if the  products  concemed  are  subject  to
demanding  technical regulations  or private  standards.  Thus, the reduction  of barriers  and
the  greater certainty of the EBA could stimulate new trade  from the  LDCs in the future.
However,  even a substantial  increase  in the volume of exports  of products  liberalized  in
2002 will have  little impact  on overall  exports.  The impact of the  future liberalization  of
bananas, rice and sugar could have  a more profound impact on particular countries, but not
the ACPs in general, since the majority do not export these products. This impact will be
determined by the extent to which current tariff quotas are binding on trade.
The small impact of the EBA in 2001  reflects that the vast majority of EU imports from the
LDCs (99.5  per cent in 2001) were already eligible for tariff and quota free access. Hence,
we now proceed to look at trade in all products covered by EU preferences,  including those
previously  liberalized  under  the GSP  and the Cotonou Agreement  to try and assess what
role  EU  trade preferences  in general  have  been  playing  and  could play in  assisting the
integration  of the  LDCs  into  international  markets.  We  start  by  looking  at  two  broad
measures  of the  potential  impact  of the  EBA,  now  defined  more  broadly  as  EU trade
preferences  in general,  on the exports of the least developing countries:  first, the coverage
of the  EBA  for  each  country,  that is,  the  importance  of exports  which  are  subject  to
preferences  in  relation  to  total  exports  to  the EU  and  second,  the  extent  to  which  the
available preferences  are actually utilised.  On the first point, if a country mainly exports to
the EU products that are already  subject to zero  or low MIFN  tariffs then the preference
scheme will have little direct short-term  impact on exports.  The key contribution that may
arise  is if the  scheme  encourages  a degree  of export diversification  into products  where
preferential  margins  remain.  As  noted  above,  the EBA  is potentially  an important  step
forward in this respect due its unlimited duration. On the second point preferences are only
valuable  from  an economic  point of view to the extent  that they are  actually  granted.  A
7scheme which offers preferential  access but which contains rules that constrain or prevent
delivery of improved  access will be of little importance.
3. The Potential Impact of EU Trade Preferences with Current  Trade Structures
Table  3 classifies  each  of the LDCs  along these  two  dimensions  on the  basis of data on
exports  to  the  EU  in  2001.  We  look  first  at  the  importance  of  products  for  which
preferences,  whatever their  magnitude,  are  available  and  allocate  countries  according  to
whether such products comprise  less than 5 per cent of total exports, for which we deem
the  initiative  to  be  having no  direct  impact  given  the  current  structure  of exports,  when
such products  comprise between 5 and  30 per cent of total  exports to the EU we  take the
initiative to be of low relevance,  and when products subject to preferences  amount to more
than  30 per cent  of exports we  take  the  initiative  to be of high  relevance  given current
exports. These dimensions are shown in the rows  of Table 3. For seven countries,  Angola,
Central African Republic,  Chad, Congo, Liberia,  Niger and Vanautu, products eligible for
preferential  access to the EU under the EBA comprised less than 5 per cent of total exports
to the EU in 2001.  It is worth noting that none of these countries currently export bananas,
rice  or sugar  and  so  further liberalisation  under  the  EBA is  likely  to have  no immediate
impact.  For  these  countries  exports  are  dominated  by products  where  the  MFN  duty  is
already  zero.  Specifically,  for  each  country  in  2001  the  key  products  were:  Angola
(oil/diamonds),  Central  African  Republic  (diamonds/wood),  Chad  (cotton),  Congo
(diamonds),  Liberia (sea-going  vessels/wood),  Niger  (uranium)  and  Vanautu  (sea-going
vessels).
For these countries  the key issue is export  diversification.  The extent to which preference
schemes such as the EBA assist in the process  of export diversification  is worthy of further
study.  For  this particular  group  of countries,  for whom  extensive  trade  preferences  have
been  available  under  the  Cotonou  Agreement,  there  has  been  little  apparent  export
diversification,  although  diversification  may have  been  stymied by the  weak contractual
nature of the preferences.  Preferences  under the EBA provide for greater certainty.  This  is
a  crucial  issue  and one  where  it  would be useful  if there  were  to  be monitoring  of the
impact of the EBA  on export diversification  and careful  analysis of constraints upon the
8export  of a broader  range  of products.  Such  constraints  are  likely  to  include  technical
regulations  and  standards  in  overseas markets  and the  costs of transport  and other trade-
related infrastructure.
A further fifteen  countries  are  classified  as  those  where EU trade preferences  are of low
relevance  given  current  exports  since the  share  of exports of products  where preferences
are available  comprises  a significant  but not  substantial  share  of total  exports  to the  EU,
that is, between  5 and  30 per cent.  With the exceptions  of Afghanistan  and Bhutan, all of
these  countries  are  from  the  ACP  region.  Finally,  the  majority  of LDCs,  25  countries,
comprise the group for which products subject to preferences  account for more than 30 per
cent of current exports. The remaining non-ACP countries all fall into this category.
Hence this classification  gives a crude  first indication  of the potential importance of trade
preferences  for the various ACP  countries  with  current  export  structures.  However,  it is
important to go further and look at the magnitude of the preferences  that are being granted.
This is provided in Figures 2 to 4 which show the average margin of preference in the EU
market if all available  preferences were  fully utilized (as will be discussed  later, this cannot
be  stressed  enough).  This  was  computed  as  the  implicit  transfer  (the  sum  across  all
products  of the MFN  tariff6 multiplied by the value of exports)  divided by the value  of
total exports to the EU in 2001.7 This is equivalent to the trade weighted average tariff that
would  arise if MFN duties were applied.  The three figures  group countries  according to a
perceived  insignificant current value of preferences,  a potential  transfer of less than  1 per
cent  of the  value  of  exports  to  the  EU,  countries  for  whom  the  potential  value  of
preferences  is currently  low,  of the  order  of between  1 and  5  per  cent of exports,  and
6 Throughout we use the post-Uruguay  Round ad valorem tariffs  and the ad valorem equivalents of specific
duties. For some products, such as confectionary,  the duty is complex being based upon an ad valorem tariff
and specific  rates according to sugar and milk contents.  For these products, without  further information,  the
ad valorem equivalents of the specific  duties for average  sugar and milk contents were applied.
7 This  does not  include  the  value preferences  for the  delayed  liberalisation  products  of bananas,  rice  and
sugar. For these products  the value of preferences  depends upon the extent to which exports exceed the tariff-
free  quota.  Thus,  for those  countries  which  are  significant  exporters  of these  products,  Malawi,  Sudan,
Madagascar,  Zambia  and  Tanzania,  the  potential  transfer  could be  higher than shown  here.  Nevertheless,
since  three  of these  five  countries  are  classified  as  having  a  high  potential  transfer  under  the  EBA  the
omission of sugar, rice and bananas will not distort the overall picture given by Figures 2 to 4.
9countries  for  whom  the  current  value  EU  preferences  is  potentially  substantial,  that  is,
equivalent to more than 5 per cent of the value of current exports to the EU.;
Figure  2  shows  the  countries  where  EU  preferences  are  currently  insignificant  and
comprises  all 7 countries identified  above as having a share of preferential  exports in total
exports  of less  than 5 per cent.  These  countries  are joined in this figure by 6 other ACP
countries  and  Bhutan.  Whilst  these  countries  exports  are  characterized  by  a  higher
proportion  of products  which  are  subject  to  preferences,  the  MIFN  tariffs  on  these
preferences  are low.  For example,  the majority  of preferential  exports  by Mali  are hides
and skins where the average EU tariff is only 2 per cent. In general, EU preferences for this
group  of countries  are unlikely  to being  having  any  substantial  impact  on exports under
current trade structures.
Figure 3 shows the group of countries for whom the potential value of EU preferences with
the  current  structure  of exports  lies between  1 and  5 per cent  of the  value of exports  in
2001.  The figure  also  shows that the average  for the ACP countries  lies  at just over  2 per
cent. If fully exploited EU preferences  to ACP countries amounted to a transfer equivalent
to approximately  1.92  Billion Euros  in 2001.  To  reiterate,  the  actual transfer  would have
been less than this due to the fact that only a proportion of exports from the ACP countries
to  the  EIJ  would  have  been  granted  preferential  access  to  the  EU.  Some  exports  would
have paid the MFN tariff.
Figure  4  shows  the  group  of countries  for  whom  EU  trade  preferences  are  of  greater
significarnce under  current trade structures,  which in our very crude breakdown  is defined
as when the  value of the potential  transfer  exceeds  5 per cent of the  value of exports  in
2001.  The  Figure  highlights  the  substantial  impact  that  EU trade  preferences  could be
having  on  the  non-ACP  LDCs.  For  these  countries,  the  current  potential  transfer  on
average  is  equivalent  to  11.26  per  cent  of the  value  of exports  in 2001.  In  general,  this
reflects the high share of clothing products  in the exports of these countries to the EU, for
which  the EU tariff is typically  12 per cent.  The very  high value of the potential transfer
for the Maldives  reflects the importance  of clothing  exports but also  exports of prepared
10Tuna, for which the EU tariff is 24 per cent. The Maldives also highlight the importance of
taking account  of the amount of exports which are  actually granted preferences,  since  for
this country,  the value of the actual transfer in 2001  was no more that 5.5 per cent of the
value  of exports  in  2001.  For  Nepal,  Laos,  Cambodia  and  Bangladesh,  the  potential
transfer  under EU preferences is also  substantial. There are a number of ACP countries in
the  group  for  whom  the  potential  value  of EU  trade  preferences  with  current  trade
structures is high.  They include Malawi, primarily due to exports of tobacco, Madagascar
(fish and clothing), Mozambique (unwrought aluminium), Uganda (fish and tobacco).
Thus,  this  analysis  shows  the  vastly  different  impact  that  EU  trade  preferences  can
potentially make for the various  LDCs which are eligible for duty and quota free access to
the EU market under the current structures of exports of these countries. For a group of the
ACP countries EU preferences are not significant with the products currently exported. For
countries  such  as  Chad  and  Liberia  the  potential  value  of EU  preferences  currently
amounts  to less than one tenth of one per cent of the value of exports to the EU, reflecting
that the  structure  of exports  is  dominated  by products  for  which  the  MFN duty  is zero.
However,  there  are  also  a  number  of countries  for  whom  the  potential  value  of  EU
preferences  is currently  substantial.  The  analysis  shows  a clear distinction  between  the
non-ACP countries on average,  for whom preferences  are potentially of high significance
and the average  for the ACP countries, where EU trade preferences  are typically much less
important under current trade structures.  This analysis has been based on the importance of
EU preferences  if all  exports  from  the  LDCs were  granted  preferential  access  to the  EU
market.  We  now  proceed  to  look  at the  available  information  on the  actual  take-up  of
preferences under the EBA.
4. The Utilisation of Preferences
The  take-up  of preferences  is  the  other  key  factor  which  defines  the  impact  of trade
schemes  such  as  the  EBA.  The  columns  of Table  3  show  the  allocation  of the  LDCs
according  to the  share of exports which  requested8 preferential  access  to the  EU market
8 Thus,  the amount actually  granted  preferential  access  could be less than  this  figure.  We suspect  that the
main reason why  traders  forego  the financial incentives  that are available  and do not request  preferences  is
11under the EBA in the value of exports which were eligible for preferential  access, the later
being  the  value  of exports  for  which  the  MFN  duty is  non-zero  (with  the  exception  of
bananas,  rice and sugar).  Again we present a crude breakdown  according to whether there
is no take-up of preferences (exports requesting preferences were less than 5 per cent of the
value  of  exports  eligible  for  preferences),  low  take-up  of  preferences  (the  ratio  of
requesting  zero duty access over eligible between 5 and  30 per cent),  and high utilization
of preferences  (more than 30 per cent of exports eligible for preferences requested to enter
the EU market duty free).
It  is striking  from Table 3 that  for almost  all of the ACP  countries there is no-take up of
preferences  under the EBA.  Lesotho, is a notable exception. In contrast, for the majority of
the non-ACP countries there is a high-take up of preferences.  We suspect that the very low
utilization  of preferences  under  the EBA by the  ACP countries  reflects that most of the
exports  from  these  countries  entered  the  EU under  the  Cotonou  Agreement  rather  than
under the EBA in 2001.  This begs  the question of why these countries  are still using the
Cotonou Agreement  rather than  the  EBA to  access  the EU market.  On the one hand this
may just reflect  the delay  in adjusting to  the new  scheme and also,  as we have discussed
above,  the majority of exports from ACP countries  were already entering the EU duty free
under Cotonou  and  at present  there is no incentive  to  change  to EBA, particularly  given
that  different  documentation  is  required  to  use  the  EBA  (Form  A)  and  the  Cotonou
(EURI).  Although,  we  noted  above,  see  Table  2,  that  even  for products  where  the EBA
offers better access than Cotonou there has been no take-up of preferences under EBA.
On the other hand, the lack of use of EBA may reflect some important differences  between
the  two  schemes.  Most  notable  amongst  these  are  differences  in  the  rules  of origin.
Although,  the  required  degree  of processing  tends  to  be  the  same  for  each  product
category,  a number of the general rules vary substantially:
that the costs of attaining them exceed their value. The key factors raising the costs of obtaining preferences
are  the rules  of origin  and the administrative  costs of proving conformity  with  those  rules.  There  is some
suspicion  regarding  the  data  provided by  the  Netherlands  which  may  understate  (to an  unknown  extent)
requests for preferences.  This will not distort the key findngs that are presented.
12o  Cumulation: Cumulation  allows  inputs  from  specified  countries  to be  treated  as
originating  materials.  The  EBA  is  contained  within  the  EU's  GSP  scheme  and
therefore  is governed by the rules of origin  specified in the  GSP.  Under the  GSP
diagonal cumulation  can  take  place  within  four  regional  groupings:  ASEAN,
CACM,  the  Andean  Community  and  SAARC.  Diagonal  cumulation  allows
originating  materials  (those which  satisfy the EU rules of origin  for that product)
from regional partners  to be further processed in another country in the group  and
treated  as if the materials  were originating in the country where  the processing  is
undertaken.  However,  this flexibility in sourcing is constrained by the requirement
that  the value-added  in the  final  stage of production  exceeds the  highest customs
value of any of the inputs used from countries in the regional grouping.
Cumulation under the EBA is not available to the ACP countries.  Such cumulation
is a possibility for Cambodia and Laos within ASEAN and for Bangladesh, Bhutan,
Maldives and Nepal within SAARC.  Thus,  for example,  the standard rule of origin
states  that  clothing products  must be made  from yam.  In other  words,  the  fabric
from which  the  clothes  are  cut  and made-up  must  be  woven  in  the  beneficiary
country or the EU. With diagonal cumulation  clothing producers  in Cambodia  can
use  fabrics from Indonesia  (providing  they  are  originating,  that  is produced  from
the stage of fibres) and still receive duty free access to the EU. Similarly, producers
in Nepal can import originating  fabric  from India.  This provides  for slightly  more
freedom in sourcing decisions than is available under the basic rule of origin.9
However,  UNCTAD  (2001)  shows  how  the  value  added  requirement  can  render
regional  cumulation of little value.  For example,  value-added  in the making  up of
clothing  in Bangladesh  ranges  from  between  25  and 35  per  cent  of the  value of
exports. However, value-added in the production of fabrics in India is around  65 to
75  per  cent.  Regional  cumulation  allows  clothing  produced  in  Bangladesh  from
9 For certain textile and clothing products, but subject to quantitative lImits,  Cambodia, Laos and Nepal  have
requested  and been  granted  a derogation  from the rules for certain  textiles  and clothing  products such that
originating  inputs from any countries belonging to the SAARC,  ASEAN or the ACP can count as originating
materials.
13Indian  fabrics  preferential  access  to  the  EU but  not  at  the  zero  rate  (for  which
Bangladesh  is eligible) but at the rate for which India is eligible, which is only a 20
per cent reduction from the MFN rate, that is a tariff of 9.6 per cent.
Under the Cotonou Agreementfull  cumulationl'  (Inama (2002)) can occur with any
of the  ACP countries  and  there  is  no  requirement  concerning  value-added  in  the
final stage relative  to the customs  value of inputs used.  There is also the possibility
for cumulation with South Africa, provided that the value added exceeds  the value
of  materials  from  South  Africa,  and  with  neighbouring  non-ACP  developing
countries,  although highly constrained  for textile and clothing products.  Hence it is
possible that ACP countries using materials  from  other ACP countries  qualify  for
duty free access to the EU market under the Cotonou Agreement but not under the
EBA.
*  Tolerance Rule/Minimum Processing: Under  the  EBA  non-originating  materials
which according to the specific  rules of origin cannot be used in the manufacture of
a product may  nevertheless be  used provided  that their  value  does not exceed  10
per  cent  of the  ex-works  price  of the  product.  Under  Cotonou  non-originating
materials up to a total value of 15 per cent of the ex-works prices can be used."
*  Fish: For a number of the ACP countries  (Angola, Benin, Eritrea,  Gambia,  Guinea,
Guinea Bissau, Madagascar,  Mauritania, Mozambique, Sao Tome, Togo, Tanzania,
Uganda)  fish  are  a major  export.  Although  the  basic processing  rule  is the  same
under  the  EBA  and  Cotonou,  all  products  used  must  be  wholly  obtained,  the
'°  The most advanced form of cumulation, fill cumulation,  allows  for any working  or processing  (even if it
does not confer  origin) undertaken in one country  to be carried forward  to another country and counted  as if
it were undertaken  in the country of final processing.  For example,  a clothing product made  in one country
from  fabric  produced  in  an  regional partner  which in  turn was  made  from  non-originating  yam  would be
eligible  for duty  free  access  to  the EU  under  full  cumulation but  not under diagonal  cumulation  since  the
fabric  would  not be  deemed  to be  orngmating  (the rule  of origin  for  the fabric  requires  manufacture  from
fibres).
1  l In both cases this is predicated  on specific  rules on maximum values of non-originating materials not being
violated.  For example,  the  rule  of origin  for preparations  of vegetables,  fruits  etc  preserved  by sugar  (HS
2006) requires that materials  of Chapter  17 (sugar) do not exceed 30 per cent of the ex-works price.
14conditions  pertaining  to  the  vessels  which  catch  the  fish  are  more  liberal  under
Cotonou (see Annex  1).
Hence  there are a number of reasons why the ACP countries may not be utilizing the duty
free  preferences  under  the EBA and are still using the Cotonou Agreement  to access the
EU market.
For  the  non-ACP LDCs we can analyse  the issue of the take-up  of preferences  in more
detail  since  exports  from  these  countries  can  only  achieve  duty-free  access  to  the  EU
market  under  the EBA.  Given  our data  on the  amount  of exports eligible  for preferences
which  actually requested  duty free  access we can derive (the lower bound on) the amount
of exports which actually pays the MFN duty rate.
Table  4  shows  that  on  average  50  per  cent  of exports  from  the  non-ACP  countries
requested  duty  free  access  to the  EU  market  in  2001.  This  implies  that  at  least  half of
exports  from  these  countries  to  the  EU did  not  receive  preferential  access  and paid  the
MFN  tariff  rate.  The  take-up  of preferences  varies  from  less  than  10  per  cent  for
Afghanistan and Bhutan to 36 per cent for Cambodia,  50 per cent for Bangladesh  and over
70 per  cent  for Nepal  and Yemen.  The  next column  of the table  shows  the  value  of the
implied  transfer  for the  exports  that  may have  entered  duty  free,  that  is,  the  value of
exports  which  requested  duty  free  access  multiplied by  the MFN  tariff.  On the  basis of
exports  in 2001  this amounted  to  a transfer of 2.3  Billion  Euros.12 The table shows  that,
given the size of overall exports, most of this transfer went to Bangladesh,  which received
1.9 Billion Euros.
The next column of the Table shows the value of the transfer that was foregone, that is, the
additional  transfer  that  would  have  arisen  if all  exports  from  the  these  countries  had
entered the EU market with zero duties.  Thus, if the EBA had delivered duty free  access to
all of the exports recorded  as having come from Bangladesh then there would have been an
12  This is assunmng  that all of the transfer  goes  to the exporter.  Olarreaga  and Ozden  (2003)  suggest that a
substantial part of this transfer could be going to the importers.
15additional transfer of 1.93  Billion Euros. The table then shows the delivery ratio,  the value
of preferences  that requested duty free access compared to the total available transfer if all
preferences  were utilized. This will be lower than  the ratio of exports requesting  access to
exports  eligible  for preferences  if the take-up of preferences  tends to be lower for higher
tariff products.  With  the  exception  of Afghanistan  and  Bangladesh  this  is not  the  case,
although  the weight of Bangladesh  entails that the delivery ratio for the group as a whole is
lower.
The penultimate  column  of the table  shows the  value  of the  total potential transfer  (the
actual  transfer  plus the transfer  foregone)  as  a proportion  of exports  to  the EU in  2001.
These are the data that were presented in Figures  3 and 4. Thus, on average the EBA could
deliver  a transfer equivalent to  11  per cent of the exports of the non-ACP LDCs in 2001.
The final column shows the transfer foregone as a proportion of exports to the EU which is
equivalent  to the trade weighted  average tariff that the exports of these countries  actually
faced.  The difference  between the  two columns  shows that value of the transfer  actually
made as a proportion of exports to the EU. For Bangladesh,  the EBA led to a transfer (or a
margin of preference)  equivalent to 5.65 per cent. However,  the lack of full utilization of
the available  preferences  entails that Bangladesh  faced  a trade-weighted  average tariff of
5.8 per cent,  which is far in excess of the trade-weighted  average  tariffs paid by many non-
preferential  exporters  to  the  EU!  Cambodia,  Laos and  the  Maldives  all faced  relatively
high  average  tariffs  when  exporting  to  the  EU  after  taking  into  account  that  only  a
proportion of exports could have  entered the EU duty free.
If we assume that the same factors which constrain  the take-up of preferences  by non ACP
countries also afflict the ACP countries and that the utilization of preferences  by the ACP
countries  was on average  similar  to that of the  non-ACP  countries  then the  value of EU
preferences  under current  export  structures becomes  even less  for these countries  with an
implicit transfer of around 1 per cent of the value of exports to the EU in 2001.
16§. Reasons for the Under-Utilisation of Preferences
Brenton and Manchin (2003) argue that the prime suspects for the lack of utilization of EU
trade preferences  are  the  rules of origin,  both  in terms of the nature of the rules defining
specific  processing  requirements,  with  the  constraints  that  this  entails  for  international
sourcing  from  the  lowest  cost  locations,  and  the  costs  of providing  the  necessary
documentation  to prove conformity with the rules.  The costs of documentation related to
the rules  of origin are  compounded  by the requirement  that goods for which  preferences
are requested are shipped directly to the EU and that if they are in transit through another
country, which will be the case for most of the LDCs, then documentary evidence must be
provided to show that the goods remained under the supervision of the customs authorities
of the  country  of transit,  did  not  enter  the  domestic  market  there  and  did  not  undergo
operations  other than unloading and reloading. In practice it may be very difficult to obtain
the necessary documentation.
Rules  of origin  are  required  to  prevent  trade  deflection,  whereby  products  from  non-
beneficiary  countries  are  re-directed  through  LDCs  to  exploit  the  preferences  that  are
available.  This  is  indeed  necessary  but the  rules of origin  should be no  stricter  than  is
required to fulfill this function. Rules of origin which are more strict than is necessary will
act to protect producers  in the preference granting  country and undermine the value of the
preference scheme for the LDCs. Unfortunately there appears to be no analytical work that
assesses  the optimal rule of origin from  a practical point of view that would prevent  trade
deflection. One suspects that in most cases a simple change of tariff heading would suffice,
compared to the complex rules in most preferential  trade schemes.
The fact that only a proportion of exports which are eligible for preferences  are requesting
preferences  suggests  that  much  more  than  trade  deflection  is  at hand.  Deflected  trade
would request preferences.  This  in turn  suggests  that on average  50 per cent  of recorded
exports from the non-ACP LDCs which are eligible for zero duty access to the EU market
and  which  are  not  deflected  trade  from  non-eligible  countries  are  not  getting  that
preferential  access.  If the reason for this lack of take-up of  preferences  is inability to satisfy
17the rules of origin or the high costs of proving origin,  which are the prime suspects, then
clearly the rules'are restrictive relative to the objective of preventing trade deflection.
A  reason which  has been  used to justify strict rules of origin  is that they  encourage  the
development  of integrated  production structures  within developing countries to maximize
the impact on employment  and to ensure that it is not just low value-added  activities which
are  undertaken  in  the  LDCs.  This is not  a reasonable  justification  for the  strict rules of
origin  that  are  applied  by  the  EU  and  the  other  OECD  countries.  First,  such  rules
discriminate  against small countries where the possibilities for local sourcing are limited or
non-existent  (Hewitt  et  al  (1995)).  Since  most  LDCs  are  small  countries  they  are
particularly  disadvantaged  by  restrictive  rules  of origin  relative  to  larger  developing
countries.  Regional cumulation  provisions have been introduced to reduce the constraining
effect of the current rules of origin.  Nevertheless, they still hamper the choice of sourcing,
the ACP countries can source materials from each other but not from low-cost locations in
Asia,  for  example,  and  as  noted  earlier  there  are  further  restrictions,  in terms  of value-
added requirements  on the extent to which cumulation  can be used.
Second,  there  is  no  evidence  that strict  rules  of origin over the  past  20  years  have done
anything  to  stimulate  the  development  of integrated  production  structures  in developing
countries.  Third, this argument would be much more convincing if the rules of origin were
defined by a process of discussion with the developing countries to identify what would be
appropriate.  They are not. They  are defined  and imposed  by the EU, the US  and so  on. It
seems very  difficult  to  argue  that  the  double  or  triple  processing  requirements  (yam  or
fibre  forward  rules)  that dominate  both EU and  US preference  schemes  were  introduced
for the  benefit  of textile  producers  in developing  countries  as opposed  to the  benefit  of
textile  producers  in  the  EU  and  US.  Finally,  globalisation  and  the  splitting  up  of the
production chain does not allow the luxury of being able to establish integrated production
structures  within  countries.  Strict  rules  of origin  act  to constrain  the  ability of firms  in
LDCs to  integrate  into these  global  production networks  and  in effect  act  to dampen  the
location of any value-added activities in these countries.
186. Conclusions
The EBA initiative is an important  step forward in the treatment of products from LDCs in
the EU market. It sends a clear signal that all products from LDCs will be eligible for  duty
and  quota  free  access  to  the  EU  market  and  that  such  access  will  be  maintained
indefinitely.'3 This is where the main impact of the changes introduced by the EBA will be
felt in the future,  that  is, in the extent to which they provide  for the diversification  of the
exports  of LDCs, which  has  been so  lacking  in the past.  Such  a policy  should be  more
broadly  adopted by all OECD countries,  preferably bound under the auspices of the WTO
and with a common and more liberal approach to rules of origin.
The  direct  impact of the  EBA  in  2001  was  negligible  since  a very  small proportion  of
exports from the LDCs was involved and for the least developed ACP countries even those
products which were  eligible  for  improved  access did not enter the EU market  under the
EBA.  The  principle  impact  of the  changes  introduced  by the  EU in  2001  on  products
currently  exported  will  arise  for  products  for  which  full  liberalization  was  delayed:
bananas,  sugar and  rice. However,  these products  are important only for a minority of the
LDCs and accounted for just a half of one percent of the exports to the EU of the LDCs as
a group  in 2001.
For a number  of the  least  developed  ACP countries,  under current export structures EU
tariff preferences  in general  can play nothing more than  a minor role in integrating these
countries  into the  world  economy.  The  average  tariff that  these  countries  would  pay if
preferences  were removed, the average margin of preference, is less than  1 per cent. Thus,
for these  countries the paramount trade policy issue is that of trade diversification  rather
than  that  of market  access  for  the  bundle  of products  currently  exported.  For  trade
preferences in the EU to be of real value they must facilitate the export of a broader range
of goods.
13 There are, however, the concerns  over the provisions  for the suspension of preferences  in the agreement
and the uncertamty that these may introduce.
19The lack of trade diversification of many LDCs despite duty free access to the EU for more
than a decade  for the vast majority of tariff lines under the Lome Convention  and the GSP
is not encouraging  in this respect.  However,  the EBA is different since the preferences  are
not time limited,  providing  greater certainty for investors  and  traders.  It is important  that
the  impact of the EBA on diversification be monitored  and constraints  on the export of a
broader  range  of products  identified  and alleviated.  In many cases  supply  constraints  are
drastic and it is these which should be the focus of trade-related  technical assistance.
Nevertheless,  with the preference  scheme  attention needs  to  focus  on the rules of origin
and the extent to which these limit the possibilities  for export diversification.  The rules of
origin are particularly restrictive  for  simple manufactured  products,  such as clothing,  and
for  processed  food  products,  precisely  those  manufactured  products  where  export
diversification maybe feasible  for these LDCs. This group of countries  stands out as a case
for the  current  complex  rules  of origin to be replaced with  a more  simple  requirement  to
confer  origin  for  all  products,  such  as  change  of tariff heading.  For  other  LDCs,  EU
preferences  are of more  significance  under  current  export  structures by providing  a more
substantial  margin  of preference.  However,  the  available  evidence  from  the non-ACP
countries  suggests that there are constraints  upon the ability of these LDCs to fully exploit
the available preferences  in the EU market.
So, although EU trade preferences  do entail  a significant  margin of preferences  for many
of the LDCs the full potential of the  scheme is not being realized.  The under utilization of
preferences,  which we believe  is due to difficulties  in satisfying  the rules of origin, entails
that a substantial proportion  of exports of LDCs to the EU pay the  full MIFN  tariff.  Since
the  products  exported  by many  of the  LDCs  are  subject  to  relatively  high  MFN  tariffs,
such  as  those  applied  to  clothing,  exports  from  the LDCs  can  still  face  substantial  tariff
barriers  to access the EU market. This has a number of implications for the modeling of the
impact of trade  liberalization.  Models which  assume the full take-up  of preferences  under
trade schemes such as the EBA will overstate the economic benefits of such schemes  to the
LDCs due to the under utilization of preferences  in practice.  It then follows that  estimates
of the  impact  of preference  erosion  following  multilateral  liberalization  in a successful
20WTO round will overstate the negative impact on LDCs. Modelling  exercises  which show
the impact of more liberal rules of origin would be particularly useful.
The  ACP  countries  are  now  in  the  process  of  negotiating  changes  to  their  trade
relationships  with the EU. Under current EU proposals  the least developed ACP countries
must  contemplate  the  end  of  the  Cotonou  Agreement  and  either  establish  economic
partnership  agreements with the EU and regional  partners or revert  to the preferences  that
are  available  under the EBA.  The analysis  presented here  shows that for  a number of the
least  developed  ACP  countries  EU  preferences  are  currently  of little  value  given  the
existing structure of trade  since the majority of their exports  are concentrated  in products
with a zero  MFN duty.  Hence  for these countries  the end of the  Cotonou Agreement will
only be of relevance to their access to the EU market to the extent that the more favourable
rules of origin  under Cotonou compared  to  the EBA  provides  a stimulus  to  future  trade
diversification.  The possibilities  for cumulation between ACP countries  under Cotonou but
not under the EBA may be of particular importance in this context.
For other ACP LDCs the information  on the utilization  of the EBA in 2001  suggests that
for  the  vast  majority  of trade  the  Cotonou  Agreement  was  the  preferred  vehicle  for
accessing the EU market. This may reflect  some inertia and  lack of knowledge of the new
scheme.  However,  it may also  reflect  the more  liberal  rules of origin under the  Cotonou
Agreement.  Further studies on this issue would be very useful, for if the rules of origin are
encouraging  the use  of Cotonou  rather than  EBA  then  there may  be  significant  costs  in
shifting to the EBA. At this point, it would  appear that the EBA is not a substitute for the
Cotonou  Agreement.  This  also  highlights  that rules  of origin  should  be  a  key issue  for
countries  which  decide  to  enter  into  negotiations  to  establish  economic  partnership
agreements with the EU.
Finally, the EU has provided an important lead to other developed countries in opening up
its  market  to  all  the  products  exported  by  the  LDCs.  The  United  States  has recently
implemented  the  Africa  Growth  and  Opportunity  Act  which  offers  improved  access  to
certain  African,  but  not  Asian,  LDCs.  However,  the  US  scheme  is  less  than  fully
21comprehensive,  is  time  limited  and  its  impact  is  also  constrained  by restrictive  rules of
origin.'4 Canada has recently proposed its own  scheme of duty free access  for LDCs, but
again  certain  agricultural  products  are  excluded.  The  proposed  Canadian  scheme  does
appear  to  have  more  flexible  rules  of origin.  For  example,  for  textiles  and  clothing  the
scheme  allows  cumulation  amongst all developing  countries  (including  China and India)
with a 25  per cent value  added requirement.  What would be of immense  value would be
for the developed countries  to come together at the WTO and coordinate their positions on
market access  for developing countries  and in particular to address the issue of the under-
utilisation of trade preferences.  The prime  suspects  for this are the rules  of origin,  at the
very least it is time they were brought in for questioning!
14 See Mattoo  et al (2001).
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23Annex  1:  Simple Comparison  of the Rules  of Origin  Regarding  Vessels  under  the EBA
and Cotonou Agreement.
*  Under the EBA the vessel must be registered in the beneficiary country or the EU.
Under Cotonou the vessel must be registered in the EU or any ACP state.
*  Under the EBA the vessel must sail under the flag of the beneficiary country or the
EU. Under Cotonou the vessel must sail under the flag of any ACP country or the
EU.
*  Under the EBA the vessels must be at least 50 per cent owned by nationals  of the
beneficiary country or the EU or by companies  with a head office in either the
beneficiary or an EU state of which the chairman and the majority of the board
members are nationals of those countries. Under Cotonou these provisions are
extended to cover all ACP states. Under certain conditions the EU will accept
vessels chartered or leased by the ACP state under the Cotonou Agreement.
*  Under the EBA the master and officers must be nationals of the beneficiary  country
or an EU member and at least 75 per cent of the crew must be nationals of the
beneficiary country or the EU. Under Cotonou 50 per cent of the crew,  and the
master and officers must be nationals of any ACP state or the EU.
24Figure  1: LDC Exports to the EU, 1988 -2001
;  ,14,  I  i -
12000000 . J ;.,... .- r tOf
-.- a  . . -.  . ?,  !  - ---  - ~~~~~~~~~  |  . *  ~  I  40-%
lOiXOOOO  tr*6~  ;-  *  - - - e  ----. J----  .c-,,  ,  --  . -. e  1  2bO
it . 1  ,  :  .-  ,  .;,,  -
120%
8000000f  ' '  - :10  1
ui80  1) 600t  r  '.  .---  180%
40MM  . - - = 400x  --  i1  *z *-  r 
0  40%
20000M0
-'  -.  - . ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0  20%
0  H  0 00%
19i38  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001
|  +  Value  of Exports  (Left Scale)  --- o---  Share of EU  Imports (Right  Scale)
Table  1: The Overall  Impact of the EBA in 2001.
Exports of Products  Exports of Products under the  Exports of All  Total Exports
liberalized  under the  EBA with Delayed Liberalisation products covered  of All
EBA in 2001  (Bananas,  Rice Sugar)  by the EBA  Products
xp  rtS to the EU of all LDCs (000 Euro)
2000]  10657  [  62963  73620  11733712
20011  3658  [  60670  64328  12858993
Exports to the EU of ACP Countries
20001  10505  62904  73409  7764664
20011  3344  60596  63940  8634365
Exports to the EU of Non-ACP  Countries
20001  152  I  59  I  214  I  3969048
20011  313  74  387  4225518
25Table 2: The Imp  ortance of Products Liberalised  in 2001  under the EBA (000 Euro)
Eligible
Exports of  Exports of products  Share of exports  Export Share of
Total  Products  liberalised in 2001  exports of  iberalised in  items with
Exports to  Liberalised  equesting access  rice, sugar,  2001  in total  delayed
EU  in 2001  under EBA  bananas  exports to  EU %  liberalization %
ACP  _  ... ___.
Angola  1944630  91  (91)*  0  0  0.00  0.00
Congo  941784  7 (7)  0  50  0.00  0.01
Equatorial  Guinea  754865  0  0  0  0.00  0.00
Liberia  736973  10 (10)  0  0  0.00  0.00
Madagascar  600912  72(42)  0  8500  0.01  1.41
Guinea  579518  41(28)  0  0  0.01  0 00
Mozambique  53017  248.5  (2)  0  991  0.05  0.19
Tanzania  395283  35(35)  0  6648  0.01  1.68
Sudan  303550  778 (778)  0  13982  0.26  4.61
Mauritania  258568  6  0  6  0.00  0.00
Uganda  242524  116.3 (49)  0  55  0.05  0.02
Malawi  194903  0  0  22617  0.00  11.60
Ethiopia  159389  12(11)  0  968  0.01  0.61
1359
Zambia  158375  (159)  0  6675  0.86  4.21
Central African
Republic  152804  0  0  0  0.00  0.00
Niger  119613  6  0  0  0.00  0.00
Benin  63698  69(69)  0  0  0.11  0.00
Burkino Faso  63052  52 (44)  0  0  0.08  0.00
Djibouti  61494  38 (22)  0  0  0.06  0.00
Togo  58591  26(26)  0  26  0.04  0.02
Chad  57638  1 (1)  0  0  0.00  0.00
Mali  45726  67 (60)  0  0  0.13  0.00
Sierra Leone  38420  72 (2)  0  0  0.19  0.00
Rwanda  21782  5.5 (4)  0  78  0.03  0.36
Comoros  20770  3  0  0  0.00  0.00
Gambia  20679  41  (41)  0  0  0.00  0.00
Burundi  19474  19 (19)  0  0  0.10  0.00
Lesotho  12797  0  0  0  0.00  0.00
Haiti  16356  158 (158)  0  0  0.97  0 00
Vanautu  13653  0  0  0  0.00  0.00
Cape Verde  11803  10 (10)  0  0  0.11  0.00
Sao Tome  8009  0  0  0  0.00  0.00
Eritrea  6737  1 (1)  0  0  0.01  0.00
Solomon Islands  4975  0  0  0  0.00  0.00
Guinea Bissau  4542  0  0  0  0.00  0.00
Somalia  3047  0  0  0  0.00  0.00
Samoa  2206  0  0  0  0.00  0.00
Kiribati  728  0  0  0  0.00  0 00
Tuvalu  390  0  0  0  0.00  0.00
26Table 2 (cont.): The Importance of Products Liberalised in 2001  under the EBA
Eligible  Share of
Exports of  Exports of products  exports  Export Share of
Total  Products  iberalised in 2001  exports of  liberalised in  items with
Exports to  Liberalised  in  requesting  access  rice, sugar,  2001  in total  delayed
EU  2001  under EBA  bananas  exports to EU  liberalisation
Non-ACP  .
Bangladesh  3318865  69  68  5  0.00  0.00
Cambodia  482480  0  0  0  0.00  0.00
Laos  143716  74  74  42  0.05  0.03
Nepal  135119  0  0  0  0.00  0.00
Yemen  83596  169  91  0  0.20  0.00
Maldives  37377  1 (1)  0  0  0.00  0.00
Afganistan  23813  0  0  0  0.00  0.00
Bhutan  552  0  0  27  0.00  4.89
Total  12859883  3658 (2870)  234  60670  0.03  0.47
Total - ACP  8634365  3344  (2869)  0  60596  0.04  0.70
Total Non-ACP  4225518  313 (1)  234  74  0.01  0.00
* The number in brackets is the value of exports in  products liberalized under the EBA  but which were not recorded as
being eligible  for EBA preferences in EU customs statistics.  One possibility is that imports entered the EU in the first two
months of the year pnor to the implementation  of  the EBA  However,  cursory investigation for some of these products
suggests that Imports occurred throughout the year. Mis-recording of the data is also possible but maybe worth
investigating  whether imports of these products were denied preferences to which they were eligible.
27Figure 2: Countries for Whom the Potential Value of EU  Preferences  is Insi;gnificant
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29Table  3: The Relevance of EBA and the Delivery of Preferential Access to the EU Market in 2001
Extent of Preferential Access
No take-up of preferences  Low Take-up of Preferences  High Take-up of Preferences
No Relevance of  Angola, Central African Republic,  Chad,
EBA  Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia,
Niger, Vanautu
Low Relevance of  Bhutan, Burundi, Djibouti,  Afganistan, Sierra Leone  Haiti, Samoa, Lesotho
EBA  Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Kiribati, Mali
. Rwanda,  Solomon Islands, Sudan
High Relevance of  Benin, Burkino  Faso, Cape Verde,  Ethiopia, Maldives  Bangladesh, Cambodia
EBA  Comoros, Eritrea,  Gambia  Laos, Nepal
Guinea Bissau, Madagascar  Yemen
Malawi, Mauritania,  Mozambique
Sao Tome, Somalia, Tanzania, Togo,
I Tuvalu, Uganda, Zambia
No Relevance  of EBA - Exports eligible  for preferences < 5% of total exports to the EU
Low Relevance of EBA - 5%< Exports eligible for preferences  < 30% of total exports to the EU
High Relevance of EBA - Exports eligible for preferences >30% of total exports to the EU
No take-up  of preferences - exports requesting preferences < 5% of exports eligible for preferences
Low take-up of preferences - 5% < exports requesting preferences < 30% of export eligible for preferences
High take-up of preferences - exports requesting preferences  >30% of exports eligible for preferences
The non-ACP LDCs are  shaded in yellow.
30Table 4: Exports to the EU  Under the EBA from  Non-ACP Countries
Exports to  Exports
EU  requesting  duty  Maximum
Total  Exports to EU  requesting  free access as a  value of  Total Potential
Exports to  eligible under  duty free  proportion of total  preferences  Transfer  Transfer as a  Transfer foregone EU  EBA  access  eligible exports  granted  foregone  proportion of  as a proportion  of (Eur 000)  (Eur 000)  (Eur 000)  (%)  (Eur 000)  (Eur 000)*  Delivery Ratio exports to the  EU  exports to the EU
Afganistan  23813  5705  307  5.38  15.76  378.38  4.00  1.66  1.59
Bangladesh  3318865  3265831  1637514  50.14  187426.55  192610.83  49.32  11.45  5.80
Bhutan  552  109  2  1.65  0.12  4.51  2.51  0.84  0.82
Cambodia  482480  477700  171865  35.98  22830.63  36980.56  38.17  12.40  7.66
Laos  143716  133872  78878  58.92  9536.50  6491.26  59.50  11.15  4.52
Maldives  37377  37152  9732  26.20  2064.14  3876.08  34.75  15.89  10.37
Nepal  135119  123406  88130  71.42  7237.67  2807.27  72.05  7.43  2.08
Yemen  83596  38262  29213  76.35  3280.23  635.11  83.78  4.68  0.76
Total Non-
ACP  LDCs  4225518  4082037  2015641  49.38  232391.59  243784.01  48.80  11.27  5.77
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